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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND RETROACTIVE
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS:
THE BALANCING OF INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, EQUITIES AND
GOVERNMENTAL PREROGATIVE
ChristopherH. Clancy*
The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease
to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for
the violation of a vested legal right.
Chief Justice John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison (1803)

The frequent ability of governmental defendants to cloak themselves in a sovereign immunity defense makes Chief Justice Marshall's
words even more appropriate today. The utilization of' that defense
either effectively blocks any award by a court or renders any award
granted so incomplete as to make it meaningless and frustrating.
Sovereign immunity has experienced an ebb and flow in its significance to American law. One early twentieth century author, John
Chipman Gray, was led to state that although he had no question as
to the "interest of the topic," he still believed that "its importance
ha[d] been exaggerated." '1 It is unfortunate that today, sixty-eight
years since Professor Gray's remarks and 175 years after Chief Justice
Marshall spoke out, sovereign immunity has vigorously reappeared in
varying ways.
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It has manifested itself in the form of executive privilege. 2 The
doctrine has also been asserted by state officials as a defense against
private suits by individual citizens. 3 In yet another context, it has
been argued that, under the doctrine, the United States may protect
itself from certain liabilities to its citizens.'
Sovereign immunity has proved to be a potentially powerful obstacle to monetary recoveries by plaintiffs in suits brought under
social security programs. Most notable in this area is the muchcriticized 5 1974 decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Edelman v. Jordan.6 In that case, the plaintiffs brought suit against
certain Illinois officials administering the "federal-state" Aid to the
Aged, Blind, or Disabled program (AABD). 7 The plaintiffs contended
that the state officers, by operating under the regulations of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, had violated contrary federal regulations regarding the time allowed for the processing of applications for
the program. By not having their applications processed under the
federal rule, the plaintiffs argued that the state officials had denied
2 For a discussion of the concept of executive privilege, see United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-42 (1974). Arguably,
this privilege is technically different from sovereign immunity, although the protection
conferred by it frequently reflects sovereign immunity concepts. See generally Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974). For a general discussion of the
privileges afforded the various branches of government, see Engdahl, Immunity and
Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 41-55 (1972).
3 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). For a discussion of the Edelman
decision, see notes 6-14, 183-203 infra and accompanying text.
4 Brief for the Appellants at 16-19, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants].
5 See, e.g., Le Clerq, State Immunity and Federal Judicial Power-Retreat from
National Supremacy, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 361, 388 (1975) (Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974), criticized as a "revisionist posture" which "misconceive[d] the nature of the
judicial power conferred by article III" as a distortion of the eleventh amendment);
Comment, Edelman v. Jordan: The Case of the Vanishing Retroactive BeneJt and the
Reappearing Defense of Sovereign Immunity, 12 Hous. L. REV. 891, 920-21 (1975) (decision criticized for its arbitrary distinctions between retroactive and prospective relief);
Comment, The Eleventh Amendment and Retroactive Welfare Benefits, 36 U. PITT. L.
REV. 78 (1974) (Edelman rationale questioned as being inconsistent with federal regulations and prior court rulings); Note, Edelman v. Jordan: A New Stage in Eleventh
Amendment Evolution, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 496, 506 (1975) (decision described as
"rest[ing] on ambiguous, doubtful precedent and tenuous reasoning"); Developments In
Welfare Law, The Outlook for Welfare Litigation in the Federal Courts: Hagans v.
Lavine & Edelman v. Jordan, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 897 (1975) (denying retroactive relief to one who, after being denied benefits at the administrative level, subsequently
establishes his right in a federal court criticized as being inconsistent with congressional intent)..
6415 U.S. 651 (1974).
7 Id. at 653; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (Supp. V 1975).
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them benefits to which they were entitled, and they sought retroactive payment. 8 The district court granted their request. 9 On appeal,
the Illinois officials contended that the eleventh amendment precluded this award of retroactive benefits.1 0 The judgment of the district court was, however, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. 1 ' The
2
Supreme Court reversed.'
Since the program was partially funded by the state government,
the Court decided that any retroactive award was barred by the
eleventh amendment because it would operate on the state treasury,
having more than an "ancillary effect."' 13 This decision represented
the first time the Court discussed the effect of the eleventh amend4
ment on an award of retroactive benefits.'
One adverse effect of the Court's decision is that if persons are
wrongfully denied benefits, they must endure considerable hardship
while pursuing administrative remedies, and, if those prove unsuccessful, while seeking the aid of the courts. Even if their position is
vindicated at the end of this process, they may still be denied what
was theirs from the beginning, should the defendant successfully interpose a sovereign immunity defense.
Another harmful effect of the Edelman decision is that the
eleventh amendment bar against the award of retroactive benefits announced therein, has placed a constitutional limitation on congressional decision-making in the context of social security. At the time of
the Edelman decision, there was a fear that the state sovereign immunity doctrine adopted in that opinion would be expanded and extended to its federal counterpart, further restricting congressional
freedom. 15 Subsequent decisions have done much to allay these fears.
8 415 U.S. at 653-56.
9 Id.at 656.
10 Id. at 657-58. The eleventh amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
11 415 U.S. at 658.
12 Id. at 659.
13 Id. at 667-68.
14 Id. at 670-71. See notes 183-203 infra and accompanying text.
15 Such an extension was urged by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). This was a suit for benefits under the
solely federally funded Old Age Survivors Disability Health Insurance Act. Id. at
752-53. In its brief, the Government argued that "[tihe principles of sovereign immunity applied in Edelman under the Eleventh Amendment are equally applicable to suits
against the United States" and that sovereign immunity barred any award of retroactive
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In the area of social security programs characterized by joint statefederal funding, however, Edelman still stands and its deleterious restriction of congressional options remains.
This article addresses those issues which the renewed vigor of
the sovereign immunity doctrine has raised with respect to an
individual's ability to claim and receive retroactive benefits wrongfully denied under the social security program. Following a background discussion of the sovereign immunity doctrine, the eleventh
amendment, and the social security system, the Supreme Court's
changing view of the nature of social security benefits will be traced
and discussed. It will be demonstrated that the Court's characterization of these benefits, as either a property right or a gratuity, is crucial to an understanding of the availability of a sovereign immunity
defense to a claim for retroactive benefits. In the final analysis, it will
be shown that assertion of sovereign immunity is, at best, questionable, at worst, improper, in matters concerning retroactive social security payments, given the nature of each person's rights and
equities, and balancing these against the government's wrongdoing.
I.

HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL CONTEXT

The exact source of the sovereign immunity doctrine, as embraced by American courts, is unclear. 16 It seems most likely that it
evolved out of the organization of the English feudal system.1 7 Under
this system a lord was not subject to the powers of a court he might
convene for the subjects on his manor, but only to the court of a
noble with higher rank than himself.' The king, holding the highest
rank of all, was, therefore, subject to no earthly jurisdiction. 19 Albenefits. Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 18-19. The Court found Appellees' contention that the eligibility standard under the Act was unconstitutional, to be without
merit. 422 U.S. at 756. By reaching a negative conclusion on the merits, the Court obviated any consideration of extending the Edelman rationale to the federal immunity
context. Id.
16 See Pugh, HistoricalApproach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L.
REV. 476, 477-79 (1953); Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the United
States and its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 829 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
17 See, e.g., C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

151-53 (1972); Pugh, supra note 16, at 477. See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-19 (1963).
18 Developments, supra note 16, at 829. See generally Walkup, Immunity of the
State from Suit by Its Citizens, 36 GEO. L.J. 310, 313-15 (1948).
1' See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 8 (2d ed. 1938); 1 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1968). Although

the king was immune from suit in his own court, he was not considered to be above the
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though there are indications that, prior to the fourteenth century,
legal redress against the crown may have been obtainable for blatant
wrongs, 2 0 it is generally recognized that proceedings against the king
subsequent to that time were allowed only when he granted a petition to be sued. 2 ' The "sovereign's immunity," having been well established in the legal fiction of early Britain, was embraced at face
value by English government in general, when the monarchy later
22
declined in power.
Many commentators have questioned the acceptance in American law of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a concept obviously
inimical to democracy. 2 3 While the Constitution granted to the article III courts jurisdiction over "Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party," 2 4 the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts to "suits . . . [in which] the
United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners. ' '25 Although Chief Justice
law. The maxim that " 'the king can do no wrong' " is currently accepted as expressing
the idea that the king was not privileged to do wrong:
That you can neither sue nor prosecute the king is a simple fact, which does
not require that we shall invest the king with an, non-natural attributes or
make him other than the sinful man that he is. The king can do no wrong; he
can break the law; he is below the law, though he is below no man and below
no court of law.
1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra at 515-16; see Walkup, supra note 18, at 314-15.
20 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 197. As far back as the thir-

teenth century, it was generally recognized that the king was subject to the law and,
while ordinary writs would not lie against him in his own courts, he was thought to he
morally bound to see that justice was not denied to his subjects. See generally id.
21 Id. Since the king was considered to be "the fountain of justice and equity," he
could not deny redress to his petitioners. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 19, at 8. There
developed, during the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), the procedure of petitioning the
king which, if such petition were granted, would enable the petitioner to sue the king
in his courts. Id. See also Jaffe, supra note 17, at 5.
22 Barry, The King Call Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REV. 349, 354 (1925). See also
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility!in Tort, IV, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 31 (1926).
22 See, e.g., Mathis, The Eleventh Amnendmnent: Adoption and 1Iterpretation,2 GA.
L. REV. 207, 210 (1968); Pugh, supra note 16, at 48-81; Borchard, supra note 22, at
38-41.
24 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
25 Law of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78; see Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821). It is interesting to note that the Court seems not to have
availed itself of the statutory language of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as a reason for invoking the doctrine in a federal context during the period from 1821, when Chief Justice
Marshall alluded to the Act in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 412, to Mr.
Justice Sutherland's opinion in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). In
Williams, Justice Sutherland stated that, because the Act "has always been regarded as
practically contemporaneous with the Constitution," it was "of great value in expounding the meaning of the judicial article of" the Constitution, id. at 573-74, and then went
on to quote the pertinent statutory language limiting jurisdiction of the federal courts to
cases where the United States had brought the action. Id. at 574-81.
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Marshall made reference to the Judiciary Act in Cohens v. Virginia,26
subsequent cases exhibited an unreasoned reliance on the common
law principle. 2 7 In pursuance of this judicially-framed tenet, the
judiciary consistently held, in early cases, that the power of judicial
review did not extend to suits against the United States unless Congress, by general or special enactment, allowed such a suit to be
2
heard . 8
A difficulty faced in any discussion of sovereign immunity is the
coexistence of state sovereignty and federal sovereignty, and the lack
of any real distinction of these separate concepts in the treatment of
the doctrine by the judiciary. 29 The earliest American "assumption"
of federal sovereign immunity, Chief Justice Jay's opinion in Chisholin v. Georgia, 30 exemplified what was to become a consistent
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821).
E.g., The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 19 (1870); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152,
153-54 (1869); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 387-88 (1850); United States
v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1845); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
436, 444 (1834); see United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882) (Court acknowledged
that, while the doctrine of sovereign immunity had, throughout the nineteenth century,
"been repeatedly asserted : . . , the principle ha[d] never been discussed or the reasons
for it given, but it ha[d] always been treated as an established doctrine"); text accompanying note 39 iufra.
28 See cases cited note 42 infra.
The requirement of consent to be sued is not limited to the federal sphere. See,
e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (Court stated that the requirement of
a state's consent to be sued was "a fundamental rule of jurisprudence"); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857) ("sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts ...
without its consent and permission" designated to be "an established principle of jurisprudence").
29 For example, Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 708 (1949), notes that both federal and state sovereign
immunity present similar legal issues. Justice Frankfurter did, however, recognize that
the sources of federal and state immunity were "formally different." Id. At least one
commentator has noted that the two separate theories involve "distinct constitutional
issues." C. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 110-11. Jacobs contends that the statutory form of
state immunity raises questions "of federal-state relations," while the common law immunity involves questions of the separation of powers. Id. at 111. See also Tribe, Intergovernmental Imnmu ities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 695 (1976).
Distinctions between federal and state sovereign immunity in American case law
have been limited to passing recognition that the single doctrine has had two separate
lines of development: "As to the states, legal irresponsibility was written into the
Eleventh Amendment; as to the United States, it is derived by implication." Keifer &
Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939). Professor Jaffe attributes this lack of differentiation by the courts to the fact that the immunity theory has
developed "in terms of an abstract sovereign equally applicable to both types of case."
Jaffe, supra note 17, at 23.
30 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 469 (1793); see id. at 472-78. For a discussion of this decision, see notes 73-78 infra and accompanying text.
26

27
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commingling of the two areas of immunity. In that case, the Court
held that, pursuant to article III of the Constitution, the federal
courts could entertain a suit by an individual against a state even
absent the state's consent to the suit. 31 The Chief Justice cautioned,
in what can only be termed obiter dictum, that the holding would not
apply to situations where the federal government was a named
defendant. 3 2 He reasoned clearly and concisely that in a suit brought
"against states or individual citizens" the federal courts can look to
the "executive power" for support; "but in cases of actions against the
United States, there is no power which the courts can call to their
aid. ' 'a Thus the United States was suable only upon its consent to
such action, for it could remove, at will, the power of the very court
in which the claim was being tried.3 4
Although Chief Justice Jay only briefly mentioned the existence
of federal sovereign immunity, it was referred to as doctrine some
twenty-eight years later, again in dictum, by Chief Justice Marshall. 3 5
In Cohens v. Virginia, the state of Virginia, which prohibited lotteries, 3 6 prosecuted two individuals for the sale in Virginia of tickets in a lottery authorized by Congress to finance improvements in
the District of Columbia.3 7 Chief Justice Marshall, considering an ob-

jection to the jurisdiction of the Court,38 stated that "[t]he universally
received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted
3
against the United States."

9

31 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 479. Arguably, Chief Justice Jay was referring to a state's express consent to be sued since his reasoning was founded on the premise that a state
"by being a party to the national compact, consented to be suable by individual citizens
of another state." Id. at 473. He noted, however, that this was not an absolute principle;
it might not extend to all types of actions and demands. Id. at 478. For a detailed history
of the events leading to the Chisholm decision, see Mathis, supra note 23, at 217-19.
32 See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 478.
33 Id. Chief Justice Jay, while distinguishing federal and state immunity. on the
practical ground of judicial enforcement, actually left open the question of the suability
of the federal government. See id.
34 See id.
35 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 411-12.
36 Id. at 375.
37 Id. The persons charged and convicted of violating Virginia's anti-lottery law
were Virginia citizens and not agents of the federal government. See id. They sought a
writ of error in the Supreme Court claiming that their conduct was protected by an act
of Congress. 1d.
38 Id. at 390-91. The state challenged the Court's jurisdiction to review the state
court judgment on several grounds, among which was the fact that the state was a defendant and thus could not be sued. Id. at 376. The other challenges were that no writ
of error from the Supreme Court to the state was permissible, and that no jurisdiction to
consider this type of case was conferred by the Judiciary Act. Id. at 376.
39 Id. at 411-12.
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The Chief Justice refined the doctrine in United States v.
Clark,4 0 expanding the application of the principle and restricting the
jurisdiction of federal courts over the states. He noted that, "[a]s the
United States [is] not suable of common right, the party who institutes such suit must bring his case within the authority of some act of
4
congress, or the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it." '
The existence and validity of the doctrine was taken for granted
in a number of subsequent cases where it was referred to or invoked
without question or examination.4 2 Specific application of the doctrine
in these cases allowed the federal government to prevent courts from
enjoining law judgments in its favor, 43 to avoid paying large set-off
awards, 44 and to block private reclamation of public land on which
gold had been found.4 5 It remains uncertain, however, whether this
ready usage of immunity protection was due to good faith acceptance
of what the Court considered to be a hallowed legal doctrine, or to its
seizing upon a useful tool to extract itself from cases having political
implications, thereby hoping to avoid potential confrontations between co-equal branches of government. One can only speculate,
within the bounds of this discussion, that it was the interplay of both
motives which contributed to this long term and unquestioned appli46
cation of the doctrine.
40 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
41 Id. at 444.

42 See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433, 437 (1878); The Davis, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 15, 18-19 (1869); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153-54 (1868); Nichols v.
United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868); United States v. Eckford, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 484, 491 (1867); De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419, 431-32 (1866);
Hill v. United States, 50 U.S, (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850); United States v. McLemore, 45
U.S. (4 How.) 286, 287-88 (1845); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444
(1834).
43 Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 388-90 (1850).
44 United States v. Eckford, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 484, 491 (1868); De Groot v. United
States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419, 431 (1867).
45Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433, 434-39 (1878).
46 Chief Justice Jay's dictum in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478
(1793), contrasting federal and state sovereign immunity, recognized that, while judicial
pronouncements against a state could be enforced by the executive branch, (see, e.g.,
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1958)), the Court could not necessarily depend
upon executive support for judgments rendered against the national government. 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) at 478. See also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REV. 296, 328-33 (1925).
While the Court has recognized the need for executive support in pronouncing a
judgment against a state, it has, in a separation of powers context, ruled against the
executive branch. The most recent example is United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974). Although the validity of executive privilege was sustained in dictum, the Court
recognized that the President must be held to be accountable for his actions. See id. at
706, 711-13. In an earlier case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
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In 1882, however, the sovereign immunity principle was given
close scrutiny in United States v. Lee, 47 resulting in a significant limitation of the doctrine's application to federal officers. 4 That case involved a suit by George W.P.C. Lee in the circuit court for the
county of Alexandria, Virginia, to reclaim some 1,100 acres of the
Arlington estate of the Lee family. 4 9 Lee contended that the property
was being held illegally by a number of United States Army officers
in that no constitutional authorization for their actions could be
shown. 50 Although the sovereign immunity doctrine was generally
reaffirmed in an extended discussion, 5 ' it was held inapplicable to
(and therefore provided no protection for) commissioned officers or
agents of the United States who, while holding or administering to
property within their official function, are sued by someone claiming
52
to be the legal owner of such property.
The holding of Lee was also followed by the Court in Goltra v.
Weeks. 53 Plaintiff Goltra sought to enjoin a United States Army officer and the Secretary of War from repossessing certain river-going
towboats and barges which had earlier been leased to the plaintiff by
another government official acting under direction of the Secretary of
War, and for return of boats already repossessed. 54 The district court
(1952), a takeover of steel mills by President Truman was found to be an action beyond
his constitutional authority. Id. at 587-89. For a discussion of the judicial limitations
upon presidential power, see Gibbons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Meaning of Separation of Powers, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 435 (1974).
One commentator has observed that Chief Justice Jay's reasoning in Chisholm, if
literally applied, would also preclude judicial review of challenges to federal legislation
as being unconstitutional. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 389, 397 n.39 (1970).
47 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
48 It should be noted that at the time of the Lee decision the eleventh amendment
had been in effect for 84 years. Thus, although the Court was free to restrict the application of federal sovereign immunity, the doctrine as applicable to the states had been
more stringently delineated by the Constitution.
49 106 U.S. at 197-99. The property in question had been occupied by the Government for over ten years, administered as public property consisting of the Arlington
National Cemetery and a military station.
50 Officers and agents who administered the land in question claimed that title belonged to the Government under a "tax-sale certificate" granted by a congressional
commission which was established to collect taxes in the " 'insurrectionary districts.' "
Id. at 199. Lee claimed title under a devise in his grandfather's will. Id. at 198-99. A
jury trial rendered a judgment in favor of Lee, id. at 197, which judgment was found by
the Supreme Court not to be in error, id. at 204.
51 Id. at 204-23.
52 See id. at 222-23.
53 271 U.S. 536 (1926).
5Id.
at 539.
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ordered that the fleet be returned to Goltra, 55 but the circuit court of
appeals dismissed the injunction, 56 holding that since the vessels
were originally built with government money, the United States was
a necessary, but unsuable, party. 57 The Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal, but disagreed with the court of appeals that the United
States was an indispensable party. 58 Even if it was, however, the
Court stated that " '[t]he exemption of the United States from suit
does not protect its officers from personal liability to persons whose
rights of property they have wrongfully invaded.' "59 Both Lee and
55Id. at 542.
56Id. at 543; Weeks v. Goltra, 7 F.2d 838, 848 (8th Cir. 1925). The court of appeals
held that, since the government was the real party in interest, Goltra could not maintain
his suit unless the government submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Id. The court stated
that
[i]n such case there can be no escape from the legal conclusion the suit is, as
any suit for like purpose must be, in fact against the government in its legal
effect, and that, unless the government shall enter its appearance, no decree as
prayed in the bill of complaint may enter.
Id. at 845.
While the district court relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lee, the court of
appeals distinguished Lee on the ground that, there, the government officers were in
wrongful possession of Lee's property because the government itself had no legal right
to occupancy. Thus, the officers, acting without legal authority, could not claim an immunity defense. Id. Under the facts of Goltra, the disputed property belonged to the
federal government and any disposition thereof would affect the government as a real
party in interest. Under these circumstances, the court held that the United States could
maintain a claim of sovereignty. Id. at 846-47.
57Weeks v. Goltra, 7 F.2d 838, 844, 845 (8th Cir. 1925).
58271 U.S. at 544. While the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's reversal of
the injunction imposed by the district court, it did so only after reaching the merits of
the case to determine that the official's actions were legal, having been taken pursuant
to the terms of the agreement between the United States and Goltra. Id. at 547-50. The
Court's decision was premised on the grounds that Colonel Ashburn, the government
officer whose actions in repossessing the fleet formed the basis for Goltra's suit, was
acting within the terms of the contract between the United States and Goltra, and thus
had the right to take possession. Id. at 541-42, 550. Thus, it was not an action against
the United States and the Court felt that the lower court should have reached the issue
of whether Colonel Ashburn had the authority to act in the manner complained of rather
than dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 544, 547. The Court said:
If it was a trespass, then the officers of the Government should be restrained
whether they professed to be acting for the Government or not. Neither they
nor the Government which they represent could trespass upon the property of
another, and it is well settled that they may be stayed in their unlawful proceeding by a court of competent jurisdiction, even though the United States for
whom they may profess to act is not a party and can not be made one. By
reason of their illegality, their acts or threatened acts are personal and derive
no official justification from their doing them in asserted agency for the Government.
Id. at 544.
59 Id. at 545 (quoting at length from Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605,
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Goltra signalled a significant restriction on the original broad scope of
sovereign immunity in cases considering the federal government's accountability to its citizens. 60 However, the movement was to reverse
direction once again.
In 1949, the Court decided Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 61 in which Chief Justice Vinson's opinion renewed the
vitality and broadened the application of the sovereign immunity
concept in the federal sphere. 62 The Larson case involved a private
company's attempt to enjoin the Administrator of the War Assets
Administration from selling surplus coal to buyers other than the
plaintiff. Plaintiff had originally contracted for the coal, but the
purchase was cancelled when the company failed to make an -advance
payment. 63 The Court determined that the key question in deciding
619-20 (1912)).
It is interesting to note that the Stioison Court borrowed this particular logic from
cases of the Lee variety, id., but found additional support for the principle from cases
such as Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Davis v.
Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), all of which
rejected state sovereign immunity claims raised by state officers in actions to enjoin
them from enforcing allegedly unconstitutional state laws. 223 U.S. at 619-20. Thus, the
Stimson Court, and by implication the Goltra Court, make no distinction between federal and state sovereign immunity.
60 Compare Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926) (discussed at notes 53-59 supra
and accompanying text) and United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (discussed at
notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text) with United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
436 (1824) (discussed at note 40 supra and accompanying text) and Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82 (1821) (discussed at note 36 supra and accompanying text).
6i 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Larson has been noted in 35 IowA L. REV. 320 (1950) and 23
S. CAL. L. REV. 258 (1950). The commentators discussed the case without mention of
the social and political circumstances of post-World War II society which probably influenced the outcome. The Larson Court, however, clearly indicated that it was being
influenced by "public policy" considerations which required that the business of government not be thwarted. 337 U.S. at 704. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate concurrence, went directly to the issue: "[t]o make the right to sue the officer turn on whether
by the law of sales title had passed to the [plaintiff] would clog this governmental function [i.e., selling government property] with intolerable burdens." Id. at 705. Thus the
social utility of governmental immunity from suits, such as the one present in Larson,
seems to have been the reason for the renewed expansion of the doctrine. See also note
46 supra and accompanying text.
62 See 337 U.S. at 701-05; notes 67-68 infra and accompanying text.
63 337 U.S. at 684-85. The plaintiff, who had dealt with the War Assets Administration (WAA) in the past, offered to buy coal " 'on [the] same terms and conditions' " as a
previous contract between the parties. The contract required that $17,500 be placed in a
bank "for payment [to the WAA] upon presentation of [its] invoices." Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp. v. Littlejohn, 165 F.2d 235, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1947). This offer
was accepted by the administrator. The WAA withdrew its acceptance upon learning
that Domestic (lid not deposit the complete amount before shipment commenced, refusing to accept a $5,000 deposit together with an irrevocable letter of credit for the balance. Id.
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whether this case could be dismissed as one against the United States
(and therefore as one over which the Court had no jurisdiction) was
"whether the relief sought in a suit nominally addressed to [an] officer is relief against the sovereign." 64 Here Jess Larson, head of the
War Assets Administration, would suffer no official penalty from an
unfavorable judgment, but the federal government would have to
65
hand over a significant measure of its own property, i.e., the coal.
Under the Larson opinion, personal liability attached to the government officer only when he committed an act either outside the
scope of a statutory grant of power or under an unconstitutional
statute. 66 However, official action taken within the scope of a constitutional statutory grant of authority was deemed not to be enjoinable even when tortious, since it was also deemed to be the action of
the sovereign. 67 This holding, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be relaxed in suits for injunctive relief, thus rejected
the spirit of the Goltra decision because the Court feared that to hold
otherwise would allow individual plaintiffs to stop "[the] Government
. . . in its tracks" over "a disputed question of property or contract
right." 68 Chief Justice Vinson's reasoning in Larson was widely
criticized, 69 but it has remained unchanged by subsequent Supreme

64

337 U.S. at 687.

65 Id. at 688-89 & n.8.
66 Id. at 689-90.
67 Id. at 695. The Court stated that, "if the actions of an officer do not conflict with

the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign,
whether or not they are tortious under general law." While conceding that a governmental agent would not "necessarily [be] immunized from liability," it stated that "the
action itself cannot be enjoined or directed, since it is also the action of the sovereign."
Id.
68 Id. at 704. This rationale reflects the proposition, recognized as far back as 1840,
that "[t]he interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the
executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief." Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840) (suit to compel the Secretary of the Navy to make pension payments to a naval officer's widow). This appears to
be a primary reason justifying the sovereign immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53-54 (1944); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S.
495, 501 (1940). In Shaw, the Court also suggested that to permit such suits would affect
the government's "dignity and decorum." 309 U.S. at 501.
69 See, e.g., 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE § 27.05, at 563-66 (1958)

(Larson interpreted to hold that courts have no jurisdiction even if government acts
lawlessly because of sovereign immunity); Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensible Parties, Mandamus, 75
HARv. L. REV. 1479, 1488 (1962) (noting that the widely criticized decision was poorly
reasoned); Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review (pt. 1), 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 433-37
(1958) (analogy of a governmental officer's actions with the general law of agency described as "inapt and confusing"); Developments, supra note 16, at 854-57 (criticized as
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Court decisions. By relying on the Larson rationale, courts are frequently able to avoid "the hard task of determining the limits of offi70
cial power."In retrospect, then, it appears that the early decisions of the
Court assumed that the federal government was entitled to the protection afforded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. While the
Court, in defining the limits of federal sovereign immunity, was relatively unrestricted in a constitutional sense, an entirely different matter was presented in the area of state sovereign immunity, controlled
as it was by the eleventh amendment.
II.

HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE STATE CONTEXT

The issue of state sovereign immunity was initially raised before
the Supreme Court in the first case to be heard in the February 1791
Term. 7 1 The following year another case was argued in which a private citizen had sued the State of New York. 72 The first reported
opinion in which the issue was discussed, however, was in the 1793
decision of Chisholin v. Georgia.73 In that case, two citizens of South
Carolina brought an original action in the Court against the State of
Georgia to recover debts due. 74 The State of Georgia refused to
appear, 75 asserting that the Court had no jurisdiction over a
a presumption by the Court without adequate consideration of congressional intent); 8
STAN. L. REV. 683, 687-93 (1956) (criticized as preventing recovery, regardless of the
merits, because of the absence of an allegation of excessive authority); 55 COLUMI. L.
REV. 73, 82-83 (1955) (lower courts denied relief under Larson without consideration of
"underlying policies").
70 Byse, supra note 69, at 1491. See, e.g., Alabama Rural Fire Ins. Co. v.Naylor, 530
F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (5th Cir. 1976); Sierra Club v. Hickel, 467 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973); National Indian Youth Council v. Bruce, 366 F.
Supp. 313, 318-19 (N.D. Utah), aff'd, 485 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 920 (1974); Byse, supra at 1489, 1490-91 & n.33.
7

I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (1923). Pro-

fessor Warren notes that there is no reported opinion in this case, Vanstophorst v. Maryland. See 1 C. WARREN, supra at 91 & ni.. The only portion of this litigation to appear
in Dallas' report is in 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 401 (1792), where the Court ordered a comnission to examine witnesses in Holland.
72 Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1792). This suit was later discontinied.
Id.
732 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see id. at 429 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (noting that this
was the first case in which the question of a state's sovereign immunity "ha[d] come
regularly before the court").
74Although the Court's opinion did not set out the facts of this case, they may be
found in 1 C. WARREN, supra note 71, at 93 n.1, and Nowak, The Scope of Conigressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of
the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1430-31 (1975).
751 C. WARREN, supra note 71, at 94.
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sovereign state. 76 The Court ruled, in a four-to-one decision, that it
did have jurisdiction, and entered a default judgment against the
state. 7 7 The states' adverse reaction to this decision's anti-immunity
rule was substantially based on the fear that Revolutionary War creditors would bring suits in federal courts and, in effect, be able to
bankrupt state treasuries. 78 Thus, it has been said that the Supreme
79
Court's decision in Chisholm singularly prompted the enactment of
the eleventh amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.8 0

In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,8 Chief Justice Marshall
found the amendment inapplicable to any case where a state was not
76

Id.

77 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 479.
78

See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406; 1 C.

WARREN,

supra note 71, at

93, 99; Culliston, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. REV. 1, 9
(1967); Tribe, supra note 29, at 683.
79 1 C. WARREN, supra note 71, at 96-102; see Nowak, supra note 74, at 1431-36 &
n. 106.
Although Chisholm brought about an express constitutional proscription of suits
against states there were some notions of state sovereignty in the minds of the Framers
of the Constitution. 1 C. WARREN, supra at 96. Professor Warren stated that "the vesting
of any such jurisdiction over the sovereign States had been expressly disclaimed and
even resented by the great defenders of the Constitution, during the days of the contest
over its adoption." Id.
In the Federalist papers, Hamilton wrote:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. This is the general sense, . . . and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government
of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 508 (Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
Madison was of a similar belief. Discussing the effect of article III, section 2 of the
Constitution on suits against states, he stated that "lilt is not in the power of individuals
to call any state into court." 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
533 (2d ed. 1941). Madison was of the opinion that federal courts could, under article
III, section 2, hear an action against a state by a citizen of another state "if a state
should condescend to be a party." Id. Similarly, John Marshall-prior to his becoming
Chief Justice-argued that "[i]t is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power
should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of
individuals residing in other states." Id. at 555. Recognizing that this interpretation
would result in partiality to a state over an individual, he felt that it was "presumed"
that an individual with a just claim would obtain relief by petitioning the legislature. Id.
at 555-56. See generally Culliston, supra note 78, at 6-9.
80 U.S. CONST., amend. XI.
81 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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"a party of record." 8 2 In that case, the Ohio legislature had passed an
act which imposed a tax on the Bank of the United States for doing
business in that state. 83 Osborn, the state auditor, ordered that a sum
of money from the bank be removed, in violation of an injunction ordering him to refrain from collecting any tax. 84 The Supreme Court
affirmed an order by the circuit court directing Osborn to restore the
sum taken, plus interest, rejecting an eleventh amendment defense
raised by the state officials. 85 Adopting a literal interpretation of the
amendment, the Court stated that the suit would only be barred when
86
the state was sued as a named party.
This principle was soon qualified in a decision which relaxed this
restrictive interpretation. 8 7 Whether the state was actually named as
a party was not deemed conclusive. Acceptance or rejection of the
immunity defense in a suit against a named individual "must be determined by a consideration of the nature of the case, as presented
on the whole record." 8 8 Thus, when the state, although not named,
was considered to be the party on record, an eleventh amendment
defense was permitted.
The most significant expansion of state sovereign immunity, and
the most devastating, was in Hans v. Louisiana.89 Despite the seemingly clear language in the eleventh amendment that it barred suits
by citizens of other states or foreign countries, the Court ruled that
the amendment also protected states from suits prosecuted by their
90
own citizens.
82

Id. at 858; see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART &

WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 930 (2d ed. 1973).

83 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 739-40.
84 See id. at 740-41.
85 Id. at 903.
86 Id. at 857-58. Although Chief Justice Marshall found jurisdiction since the state

was not named as a party, he did not think that to be the real issue. According to the
Chief Justice, "the true question [was] .. . whether, in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
the court ought to make a decree against the defendants." Id. at 857. This question
required a determination of whether the parties on the record were the real parties in
interest. Id. The implication was that, if it were determined that the state was the real
party in interest, the suit would fail on the merits. See Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1972).
87 Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828); see id. at 123-24. A
claim against the Governor of Georgia in his official capacity was determined to be
against the office rather than the person. Under these circumstances, the state was
deemed to he the party on record. Id. See also Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270,
287 (1885).
88 In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 492 (1887).
89 134 U.S.

1 (1890).

90 See id. at 15.
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The Hans Court reasoned that the political atmosphere surrounding the adoption of the amendment supported a construction that the
amendment also prohibited suits against a state brought by one of its
own citizens. 9 1 The Court concluded that, since the amendment was
intended to reverse the Chisholm decision, the literal language
should be ignored in order to accomplish the underlying purpose of
restricting federal court jurisdiction over suits against states absent
their consent.92

The seemingly absolute bar that would result from this holding
has been ameliorated by Ex parte Young. 93 The Young case parallels,
in the eleventh amendment context, the Court's reasoning in United
States v. Lee. 94 In Young, the stockholders of nine railroads brought
suit in federal court to enjoin the Minnesota Attorney General, EA95
ward T. Young, from enforcing a state law reducing railroad rates.
The railroads alleged that the rates were confiscatory, depriving them
of their property without due process of law contrary to the fourteenth amendment.9 6 Despite Young's objection that the suit was, in
fact, a suit against the state to which it had not consented, and was
therefore barred by the eleventh amendment,9 7 the Court held that
the injunction was proper, relying on the common law principle that
a state officer acting illegally is deemed to act "without the authority
of" the state, and therefore outside its shield of sovereign immunity. 98 The Young decision enabled federal judicial review to encompass certain actions of state officials which would otherwise have been
unassailable had the sovereign immunity concept been broadly
applied.9 9 The Court, however, declined to decide whether the fourteenth amendment limited the effect of the eleventh, stating that
such a decision was unnecessary given the facts before it. 10 0 It was
91 The Court observed that the Chisholm decision "created such a shock of surprise
throughout the country that" enactment of the eleventh amendment did not merely reverse Chisholm. The Hans Court was of the opinion that the intent was to adopt the
position that Justice Iredell expressed in his dissenting opinion-one which held a state
to be immune from suit in a federal court absent its consent. See id. at 11-12.
92 Id. at 11, 15.
93 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
94 See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
95 209 U.S. at 129-30.
96 Id. at 130-31.
97 Id. at 149.
98 Id. at 159-60.
99 See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 208 (3d ed.
1976).
100 209 U.S. at 149-50. This question was recently considered by the Supreme Court
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), wherein the Court determined that the
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clear, however, that the eleventh amendment, in certain instances,
did not prevent a federal court from directing a state official to bring
his conduct into conformity with federal law. 1 1
The Court's vacillation between harsh rulings and subsequent attempts to lessen the effects of certain of its holdings, has resulted in a
situation where no uniform theory of immunity has developed. The
logical inconsistencies created by the myriad approaches to sovereign
immunity defy rational analysis. Although some of the finest legal
scholars have addressed the difficulties surrounding the casuistry in
10 3
the decisional law,' 02 there has been little resulting enlightenment.
Thus, a plaintiff wronged in some way by a government entity

may well perceive his situation as that of Kafka's character who was
told that
"before the law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there
comes a man from the country who begs for admittance to the law.
But the doorkeeper says that he cannot admit the man at the moment. The man, on reflection, asks if he will be allowed, then, to
enter later. 'It is possible,' answers the doorkeeper, 'but not at this
moment.' . . . The doorkeeper perceives that the man is nearing

his end and his hearing is failing, so he bellows in his ear: 'No one
but you could gain admittance through this door, since this door
was intended for you. I am now going to shut it.' "104

So stands the judiciary, as the doorkeeper. A plaintiff facing it may
well find that the door is closed to him, but will soon open as the
fortunes of the sovereign immunity doctrine rise or recede, or as he
is able by chance to select an appropriate defendant.
eleventh amendment was "necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 456. Further discussion of this case appears at notes
208-212 infra and accompanying text.
101The Young decision was met with immediate and prolonged criticism. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 209; see 2 C. WARREN, supra note 71, at 717. Congressional
reaction to the decision led to the enactment of a law requiring that a panel of three
judges hear suits to enjoin state officials from enforcing state laws alleged to be unconstitutional. 2 C. WARREN, supra at 717; see Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat.
557 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)) (repealed 1976). See generally C. WRIGHT,
supra at 212-15.
102 See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 708-24
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
103 Commenting upon Supreme Court decisions prior to Larson in which sovereign
immunity was discussed, Justice Stewart observed:
While it is possible to differentiate many of these cases upon their individualized facts, it is fair to say that to reconcile completely all the decisions of
the Court in this field prior to 1949 would be a Procrustean task.
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646 (1962).
104 F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL 267-69 (definitive ed. W. & E. Muir trans. 1972).
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

A.

Introduction

In the three decades following enactment of the Social Security
Act in 1935,105 the Supreme Court decided few cases dealing with a
claimant's rights under that Act. 10 6 This paucity of litigation is understandable when one considers the position of probable plaintiffs bringing such actions. These individuals, when denied benefits, cannot respond by litigation through trial and appellate courts because they
often lack sufficient funds to press their claims. 10 7 This situation has
been ameliorated somewhat by legal aid programs,' 08 in particular
those established by the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1964,109
which have helped many individuals gain access to the courts in
order to establish their rights under social security programs."i 0
Another problem confronting those seeking a determination of
eligibility is the complexity of the Social Security Act itself. Various
programs with attendant administrative regulations comprise the Act.

These programs provide aid to certain classes of persons and several

105 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
106See Wollenberg, Vested Rights in Social-Security Benefits, 37 ORE. L. REV. 299,

308 n.27 (1958). In an article discussing the rights of welfare recipients, Professor Reich
has concluded:
The field of social welfare has developed for thirty years with relatively
little attention to the protection or clarification of the legal rights of beneficiaries, especially in programs operating with a large degree of discretion.
Where other fields have seen the steady growth of rights through the processes
of litigation, rights that might have been developed out of existing welfare statutes have atrophied from disuse. In point of fact, the legal profession does not
even know enough about agency practices in the welfare field to be able to
identify possible denials of rights. There has been no systematic effort to find
out what statutes, rules, administrative regulations or institutional practices may
now be causing unnecessary or unjustified injury to beneficiaries or giving rise
to discrimination against some of them.
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245, 1256 (1965).
107Reich, supra note 106, at 1246, 1252.
108 See Parker, The Impact of Federal Funding on Legal Aid, 10 CALIF. W. L. REV.
503 (1974). See also Reich, supra note 106, at 1256-57.
109 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 601, 78 Stat. 508
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2941 (1970)).
110 See Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 859, 861-62
(1974); Comment, Suing State Welfare Officials for Damages in Federal Court: The
Eleventh Amendment and Qualified Immunity, 4 FLA. ST. L. REV. 105 (1975); Note,
Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 805, 805 (1967).
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are administered through joint federal-state efforts. 1 1 ' Such joint participation raises serious sovereign immunity problems.
The sovereign immunity concept is more threatening in this context than in others. First, both federal and state sovereign immunity
issues may arise in each case brought before the courts. Second, as
has been demonstrated earlier, federal and state sovereign immunity
concepts remain unclear. 112 Each of these concepts has distinct constitutional sources;" x3 yet they have been blurred by prior decisions 1 4 in which the doctrine may have been applied to achieve easy
solutions for difficult cases."l 5 The judicial failure to delineate the
scope of sovereign immunity has resulted in an ambiguous doctrine.
B.

Interests Under The Social Security Act:
Right vs. Privilege

The Social Security Act basically authorizes the implementation
of the Federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits
program (OASDI) 116 and categorical assistance programs, such as Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 11 7 Under the OASDI
program, eligibility is predicated upon compulsory contributions by
the individual and his employer."18 Proceeds collected by the government through payroll deductions are appropriated to a trust fund,
the sole purpose of which is administration of the program. 119 The
federal government does not contribute to the maintenance of the
fund, except for minor contributions.12 0 Congress has specifically re"I Programs established under the federal Social Security Act involve varying degrees of participation by federal and state governments. Compare the Federal Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-431 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975) (federally funded and administered) with the Aid to Families With Dependent Children program, id. §§ 601-610 (jointly funded by state and federal governments but state administered under federal guidelines). See Note, Social Welfare-Au
Emerging Doctrine of Statutory Entitlement, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 603, 606-07
(1969).
112 See note 29 sunpra and accompanying text.
113 See notes 40-42, 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
114 See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. at 708
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussed at notes 61-70 supra and accompanying text).
115 Byse, supra note 69, at 1490-91 & n.33.
116 42 U.S.C. §§401-431 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
117 Id. §§ 601-610. Another categorical assistance program is Grants To States For
Programs. Id. §§ 1396-1396i. See generally S. ASCH, SOCIAL
SECURITY (rev. 3d ed. 1959).
118 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For a general discussion of the funding
Medical Assistance

provisions of the Act, see G.

(1976).
119

120

REJDA, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 401(b).

18
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jected the idea of supplemental funding to this program from general
revenues. 121 Thus the program is essentially self-supporting, financed
by contributions from the private sector of society.
Categorical assistance programs, on the other hand, are generally
122
financed by appropriations from both federal and state treasuries.
Unlike the OASDI program, no contributions from recipients are collected. Furthermore, categorical assistance programs are administered by state agencies under general guidelines outlined by the federal government. 123 For example, eligibility is determined under a
federal standard 124 and is basically a function of one's economic
status, 125 whereas states are permitted to determine their own stan26
dard of need.1
Due to this structure, suits for retroactive OASDI benefits will
be brought against the federal government, while suits for retroactive
categorical assistance benefits will be brought against the state administering the program. Consequently, in suits for OASDI benefits,
the federal government may raise a sovereign immunity defense,
whereas in categorical assistance suits, the state may invoke an
eleventh amendment defense.
The availability of the sovereign immunity bar to both the federal and state governments is determined by the characterization of
the individual's interest in social security benefits. If the interest is
found to be, in essence, a "property" interest, it will merit the pro12 7
tection of the fifth amendment from an unwarranted federal taking,
and by the fourteenth amendment from a similar taking by the
state.1 28 In an action to recover retroactive benefits, if the individual
121 G. REJDA, supra note 118, at 24, 143.
122 Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-603 (1970 & Supp.

V 1975), and Grants To States For Medical Assistance Programs, id. §§ 1396a(a)(2)1396b (1970 & Supp. V 1975), provide for funding from both federal and state treasuries.
The Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind, and Disabled program, id.
§§ 1381-1383c (Supp. V 1975), however, is funded largely by federal funds, requiring
state contributions only in very limited circumstances. Id. § 1382e (Supp. V. 1975).
123 Id.
§§ 602, 1396a (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
124 Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600-01 (1972).
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 606-608, 1396d (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
126 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478-80 (1970); see Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 413 (1970). Under federal law, an individual is eligible to receive social security benefits if he can demonstrate that he is in need. However, the standards used to
determine the extent of the individual's need are established by each state. See G.
REJDA, supra note 118, at 407-10.
127 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); see notes 144-147 infra and accompanying text.
128 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976); see notes 208-212 infra and
accompanying text.
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is deemed to have a "property" interest, the assertion of a sovereign
immunity defense will not prove successful. 12 9 Where an interest is
designated a "gratuity," however, failure by the government to pay
retroactive benefits will work no deprivation of property and a
sovereign immunity defense will be allowed. 130 Thus, a determination as to the nature of the interest is crucial.
The characterization of the interest has been a germane issue in
cases throughout the history of social security litigation. While many
of the cases do not deal with sovereign immunity, the Court's findings as to the nature of benefits under the Social Security Act are
directly relevant. In Ewing v. Gardner, 3 ' the Sixth Circuit considered an individual's interest under OASDI to be a vested property
right capable of judicial enforcement. 13 2 Once a person satisfied the
33
statutory conditions for eligibility, the right to benefits accrued.'
However, the Ewing decision's vested-right characterization was
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court in Flemming v. Nestor. 1 34 Nestor, a resident alien, who had been living in the United
States for over forty years, was deported for having been a Communist party member.' 3 5 Shortly before his deportation, he became
eligible for OASDI benefits. These benefits were denied under a
statutory provision which made deportation a basis for termination of
such benefits. 136 The Supreme Court, stressing the need for flexibility in the administration of the social security program, expressly rejected categorizing
social security interests as "earned rights" or
"gratuities.' ' 1 37 Rather, it found such an interest to be a "noncontrac38
tual benefit."'
129 See

notes 131-143 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 162-203 infra and accompanying text.
131 185 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1950), rev'd in part on other grounds, 341 U.S. 321 (1951).
132 185 F.2d at 784.
130

133

Id.

134

363 U.S. 603 (1960).

135

Id.

136

Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1958).

137

363 U.S. at 610.

at 783.
at 605.

Id. at 611. The Court reasoned that this characterization was necessary in order
to permit administration of "a highly complex and interrelated statutory structure." Id.
at 610. Recognizing that the program was designed for long-range operation, the Court
refused to generalize upon the nature of a person's interest in fear that it might unduly
restrict future economic predictions. Id.
To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of "accrued property
rights" would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to everchanging conditions which it demands. . . . It was doubtless out of an awareness of the need for such flexibility that Congress included in the original Act,
and has since retained, a clause expressly reserving to it "[t]he right to alter,
138

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 363

Since the interest is "noncontractual," Congress has wider latitude in adjusting benefits in a changing society, than would be the
case if the interest were deemed to be an "accrued property" interest
requiring constitutional protection. In addition, by raising the recipient's interest from a "gratuity" classification to the level of a "noncontractual benefit," the government would be required to show a
greater justification when depriving individuals of these rights.
The Court further refined its notion of an individual's interest in
OASDI benefits in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld. 139 In that case, a husband, after the death of his wife, brought suit against the federal
government to establish his eligibility for survivors' benefits under
the OASDI program. He sought an award of such benefits from the
date of his original application.14 0 In ruling that Wiesenfeld was entitled to such payments,' 4 ' the Court held that OASDI benefits, since
dependent upon an individual's contribution to the program, should
be " 'afforded as a matter of right.' "142 Thus, there was a "statutory
right to benefits" which could not be denied. 143
Mathews v. Eldridge144 provides further, and even more explicit
support, for the principle that an individual has a statutory right to
OASDI benefits. In that case, petitioner sought to have his OASDI
disability benefits continued while awaiting a hearing on whether
such benefits should be terminated. 14 5 The Court ruled that the Social
Security Administration could terminate the benefits pending a hearing, but that should the hearing establish continued eligibility, retro146
active benefits from the date of termination should be awarded.
This holding was based upon an express determination by the Court
that a recipient's interest under the OASDI program was a statutorily

amend, or repeal any provision" of the Act ....
That provision makes express
what is implicit in the institutional needs of the program.
Id. at 610-11 (citations omitted).
This complexity in administrative procedures increases in the categorical assistance
programs due to the impact of federalism considerations. Each program involves varying
degrees of federal-state participation leading to administration of the social security
agencies of different sovereignties. See S. ASCH, supra note 117, at 16.
139 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
140 Id. at 639-42.
'41 Id. at 641-42, 653.
142 Id. at 646-47.
143 Id. at 647.
144 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

145 Id. at 323-25.
146 Id. at 339, 349. The Court also noted that if a beneficiary is found to have received undeserved benefits, negative retroactive adjustments may be appropriate. Id. at
339.
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created property interest worthy of fifth amendment protection. 14 7
Thus, it becomes apparent that in OASDI suits for retroactive
benefits, the recipient's interest in such benefits is deemed to be a
"property" right. However, it will be seen, that in suits dealing with
rights under categorical assistance programs, the Court, over time,
has tended to vacillate between characterizing such an interest as a
"gratuity" or a "property" right.
Early decisions indicated that a person's interest in social welfare
benefits was perceived as a gratuity. 148 However, during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, a fundamental
change occurred in the Court's attitude toward the nature of a
person's interest under the categorical assistance programs.' 49 This
change was first reflected in the case of King v. Smith. 150 At issue in
this case was the propriety of a state regulation which provided for
termination of AFDC benefits to any "mother who 'cohabits' in 1or
51
outside her home with any single or married able-bodied man."
Recipients brought a class action under the Civil Rights Act challenging the validity of this regulation on equal protection and federal
statutory grounds. 15 2 The Court, without reaching the constitutional
issue, sustained this challenge, invalidating the state regulation as
being inconsistent with federal law.' 5 3 The Court expressly acknowledged that federal welfare programs could no longer be viewed under
the earlier "worthy-person concept,"' 154 implicitly renouncing the
55
treatment of a recipient's interest as a gratuity.1
The Court's refusal to view a recipient's interest in welfare ben147Id. at 332.

148 See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1934); Reich, supra note 106,
at 1246; Note, supra note 111, at 608-10.
149 A number of factors probably contributed to this change in attitude. First, the
Office of Economic Opportunity began providing increased legal assistance to the poor.
See notes 109-110 supra and accompanying text. Second, with the advent of Lyndon
Johnson's "war on poverty," the plight of the poor became one of the paramount social
issues of the clay. Third, various legal commentators began advocating increased legal
rights for the poor. See Reich, supra note 106, at 1245-46. See generally Note, Legal
Services-Pastand Present, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 960 (1974); Note, supra note 110.
150 392 U.S. 309 (1968).

151 Id. at 311.
152

Id.

153 Id. at 311-12.
154 Id. at 320-21.

155 See id. at 320-27. The Court was apparently influenced by Professor Reich, who
argued that a departure from the " 'gratuity' " theory was necessitated by the Social
Security Act itself. Reich, supra note 106, at 1245-46. But cf. Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934), wherein the Court stated that
[p]ensions, compensation allowances and privileges are gratuities. They involve
no agreement of the parties; and the grant of them creates no vested right. The
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efits as a gratuity, and its recognition that this interest was of sufficient importance to warrant protection by federal courts, suggested a
change in attitude from earlier decisions. Arguably one should have
some type of property interest in a program to which he is forced to
contribute; however, this reasoning need not have been extended to
welfare benefits.
In a subsequent decision, the Court more clearly indicated that
it viewed a recipient's interest in a categorical assistance program as
something in the nature of a property interest. In Goldberg v.
Kelly, 1 56 the Court held that one's interest in welfare benefits was of
sufficient importance to require an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of such benefits. 1 57 In carefully weighing the individual's
interest in receiving continuous welfare assistance against the
government's interest in maintaining fiscal and administrative effi158
ciency, the Court found the individual's interest to be the greater.
Justice Brennan noted that "[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' "159
During the next few years, decisions in the social security area
reflected the transition which the Court underwent with the appointment of' three new Justices. These decisions waver, affording
more protection in some circumstances than in others. 160 It appears
that the Court is retreating back to its original position, characterizing
interests in categorical assistance programs as gratuitous in nature,
rather than according them even the compromise status of noncontractual benefit. As a result of this reversal, the states' sovereign immunity defense in suits for retroactive benefits under these programs
is receiving more favorable treatment. Governmental interests have
been elevated in importance with an increasing burden placed upon
beneficiaries to demonstrate that a state's actions have violated spe61
cific provisions of the federal statutory scheme.'
benefits conferred by gratuities may be redistributed or withdrawn at any time
in the discretion of Congress.
See also Frisbie v.United States, 157 U.S. 160, 166 (1895); United States v. Teller, 107
U.S. 64, 68 (1882); Note, supra note 111, at 609.
156 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
157 Id. at 264.
158 Id. at 260-66.
159 Id. at 262 n.8.

160 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 646-47 (1975); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 781-85 (1975);
Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653-59,
678 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545-51 (1972).
161 See Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 653-59, 664-69 (1974).
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This new attitude is most clearly reflected in the case of Edelman
v. Jordan.162 There, the Court attempted to reconcile conflicting
opinions in the Second and Seventh Circuits. Both Rothstein v.
Wyman' 63 and Jordan v. Weaver 16 4 involved class actions by state
welfare recipients challenging certain state officials in their administration of the Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD) program. 1 65 The question presented in Rothstein related to whether the
actions of state administrators, in dividing New York State into three
regions and establishing different rates of payment for recipients
based upon geographic considerations, violated the Social Security
Act and its attendant regulations, as well as the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 166 In Jordan, it was contended
that state and county officials in Illinois failed to comply with federal
regulations requiring that decisions be made within certain time
periods, and that benefits, when authorized, should be paid retroac167
tively from the date of entitlement.
After injunctive relief and payment of retroactive benefits were
awarded by the district courts in both cases, 168 each was reviewed by
a circuit court of appeals-with directly contradictory results.' 69 The
Second Circuit, in deciding Rothstein, held that the lower court's ordering of retroactive benefit payments represented "an improper exercise of equity jurisdiction." 70 The rejection of the award of retroactive benefits was based primarily on the policy considerations inherent in a scheme of cooperative federalism, with the court's goal being
the maintenance of harmonious federal-state relationships. 17 1 The
162415 U.S. 651 (1974).

163467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973).
164472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nora. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
165472 F.2d at 987-88; 467 F.2d at 229.
166 467 F.2d at 229.
167 472 F.2d at 987-88.

161415 U.S. at 656; 472 F.2d at 228-31.
169

"Cornpare472 F.2d at 989, 999 with 467 F.2d at 228-29, 241-42.
170 467 F.2d at 236.
17, Id. at 232-36. The court gave lengthy consideration to the possible effects of
ordering payment of retroactive benefits on congressional welfare policies. It advanced
three reasons why such payments might be made: (1) "to deter wilful state violations of
federal requirements"; (2) to provide for "the ascertained needs of impoverished persons"; (3) to protect the federal government's interest "as grantor in the proper use of
granted funds." Id. at 235. The court rejected the retroactive payment remedy for the
protection of the first enumerated federal interest because the record did not suggest
any bad faith on the part of the state. The court strongly implied that a "consisten[t] ...
course of unlawful conduct" would be necessary to warrant federal court intervention
for such a reason. Id. at 235. With reference to the second proposition, the court noted
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court went on to say, however, that even when such policy considerations would not conflict with an award of retroactive benefits, this
type of relief would be barred by the eleventh amendment unless the
state waived its sovereign immunity.' 7 2
Relying on the decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway,' 73 the
Rothstein plaintiffs contended that New York State had waived
eleventh amendment protection by accepting federal money for the
AABD program.1 74 Parden held that a waiver of eleventh amendment
immunity could be found if a state becomes involved in activity
which is subject to congressional regulation, even if Congress has not
specifically expressed an intent to subject the states to suit. 1 7 5 The
Rothstein court reasoned that a waiver of eleventh amendment rights
that "retroactive payments become compensatory rather than remedial" if granted subsequent to the time of actual need. On the facts before it-a 16 month lapse "between
the last contested payment and the order of the District Court"--the court found that
retroactive benefits to fulfill the past needs of the plaintiffs were not warranted. Id. As
to the third proposition, the court reasoned that the federal government's "interest [as
grantor was] not personal to welfare recipients; and Congress ha[d] given no indication
that it deem[ed] retroactive payments necessary to protect its interest, since the only
remedy it expressly contemplated was a prospective cut-off of funds." Id.
It is apparent that the court limited its consideration solely to congressional interests in enforcing state compliance with federal regulations, despite the fact that the
court was urged to consider the rights of the recipients. See id. at 234, 235. The court
stated that there was no indication that the persons who had been denied benefits had
"a present compelling need for them or that it [was] provident" to provide denied benefits since any "past suffering, . . . however deplorable, [could not] be undone." Id.
at 234.
172Id. at 236-39.
173 377 U.S. 184 (1964).

174 467 F.2d at 237. The plaintiffs also based their claim to relief on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970), contending that this statute "provide[d] a comprehensive remedy for deprivation of constitutional and statutory rights." 467 F.2d at 237. The court rejected this
contention, finding that the statute referred to deprivation of rights by "persons as distinct from sovereign states, and . . . states are not persons within the meaning of that
statute." Id. at 237-38.
The Supreme Court recently decided that Congress may, pursuant to section five of
the fourteenth amendment, limit state immunity under the eleventh amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). For a discussion of this decision, see notes
208-212 infra and accompanying text.
175 377 U.S. at 189-92. The issue in Parden was whether Alabama had subjected
itself to suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1970), by operating a railroad in interstate commerce. 377 U.S. at 184. Finding that the
enactment of FELA was a proper exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce, id.
at 190-92, the Court reasoned that to permit an eleventh amendment defense in FELA
suits would create "a right without a remedy" in situations where a state was the employer. Id. at 189-90. The Court expressly recognized that state consent to suit was
required. It found, however, that when the state began its operation of the railroad after
Congress had enacted the FELA, it "necessarily consented to . . . suit [under the] Act."
Id. at 192.
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must be either express or "so necessary to the effectuation of the
congressional policies that a waiver arises by implication.' ' 1 76 In the
present instance, the court found that New York's voluntary participation in a program partially funded with federal monies and subject to
federal regulation did not constitute such a waiver. 17 7 In contrast, the
Seventh Circuit in Jordan, stated that it was "unpersuaded by [the]
reasoning" adopted in Rothstein 178 and held that the state had waived
its sovereign immunity by participating in the AABD program. 17 9 Although also relying on the Parden decision, the Seventh Circuit found
that such participation constituted an implied waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity. 180 Furthermore, the court ruled that, in cases
involving claims for retroactive benefits, a federal court may grant
equitable relief.' 8 ' While noting that ordinarily the eleventh amendment precludes an award of damages against the state, the court
characterized the specific remedy being sought as restitution. This
was so because the plaintiffs would have been entitled to the contested benefits but for the state's violation of federal regulations.1 82
176 467 F.2d at 237-38.
177Id. at 238.
178 472 F.2d at 990.

179Id. at 994-95. Once the sovereign immunity bar is lifted, the court reasoned that,
although no right of action for persons who had been denied benefits was created by
the federal assistance statutes, such persons could maintain suits against state welfare
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 472 F.2d at 994.
180 472 F.2d at 994-95. The court could not
conceive that Illinois could legitimately expect to be able to participate in the
federal program, receive federal funds in consideration for its agreement to
channel them, together with state funds, to beneficiaries in compliance with
federal law, and then be able to violate that law and invariably retain the savings accruing through that illegality.
Id. at 995.
When a state impliedly consents to suit was the issue confronted by the Parden
Court. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized the necessity of state consent to suits
brought by individuals. 377 U.S. at 192. However, the Court stated that "when a State
leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it" becomes subject to the same treatment "as if it were a private
person or corporation." Id. at 196. The Rothstein court suggested that an implied waiver
of immunity should not be easily inferred unless the state engages in "activities of the
sort generally conducted by private persons." 467 F.2d at 238. The Jordan court, however, believed that where a state enters into a joint federal-state program and receives
federal funds, it "constructively consent[s] to" suit. 472 F.2d at 994-95.
181 472 F.2d at 989-93. The court found that it was "inferable from the purpose of
congressional enactment of the AABD program that effective judicial review might include the remedy of restoration of benefits withheld in violation of federal law." Id. at
994-95. The court did, however, recognize that retroactive relief might not always be
appropriate. Id. at 995.
182Id. at 993-94.
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The Seventh Circuit's decision was reversed under the caption
Edelman v. Jordan.l8 3 The Supreme Court's opinion was the first
pronouncement by the Court on the eleventh amendment's relationship to retroactive benefits in the social security context. 184 Jordan
claimed that state officials were illegally administering the AABD
program by complying with state, rather than federal, regulations. The
state regulations authorized funds to be disbursed beginning in the
month an application was approved and not retroactively to the time
85
the application was filed.1
The question squarely before the Court, therefore, was whether
a federal court possesses the equitable power to direct state officials
to pay, out of public funds, the benefits to which applicants would
have been entitled had the state not been administering the program
in violation of law. 186 It was contended that such an order, although
on its face directed at the individual official, would actually represent
a suit against the state for monies to be paid out of the state treasury
87
and therefore should be barred by the eleventh amendment.1
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,1 88 upheld this contention,
finding that the state could raise the defense of sovereign immunity
in a suit for retroactive benefits, despite the fact that these benefits
had been wrongfully withheld. 189 The Court recognized that its decision in Ex parte Young had granted a remedy against actions by a
state performed in violation of federal laws. However, it noted that
such relief could only be prospective in nature and only have "an
ancillary effect on the state treasury. '"190 In the case sub judice, the
remedy being sought went beyond prospective relief and amounted
to an assessment of damages against the state. 9 ' Thus, Ex parte
92
Young was found not to support an award of retroactive benefits.1
415 U.S. at 678.
Id. at 670-71.
185 Id. at 653-56.
186 Id. at 657-58.
187 Id. at 663-65.
188 Id. at 652. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented separately, with
Justice Blackmun joining in Justice Marshall's dissent. Id.
189 415 U.S. at 657-59, 678.
190Id. at 664-68.
191 Id. 664, 667-68.
192 Id. at 664-68. The Court recognized that it had "summarily affirmed" several
lower court decisions which had awarded retroactive relief. Id. at 670 & n.13. It also
noted that, while the applicability of the sovereign immunity defense to retroactive
benefits had been orally argued in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the opinion in that case, affirming an award of such benefits, had not specifically addressed the
183
184
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The Court also found that, while state sovereign immunity could
be waived, such had not occurred in this instance. 19 3 Mere participation in a federally regulated assistance program did not establish
waiver, which must be demonstrated " 'by . . . express language or by
...overwhelming implication.' "194
In his dissent, Justice Douglas advanced three reasons for concluding that the state lacked immunity under the eleventh amendment. He argued that "[i]n no case when the responsibility of the
State is increased to meet the lawful demand of the beneficiary, is
there any levy on state funds;" therefore, whether the relief is retroactive or prospective in nature "the impact on the state treasury is
precisely the same. '"195 He further asserted that there was sufficient
legal precedent to support the conclusion that the amendment served
as no bar to an award of retroactive payments. 19 6 Finally, he
reasoned that the state had waived its eleventh amendment immunity
97
by participating in a cooperative federal-state welfare program.1
Justice Brennan, also in dissent, viewed the iinmunity question
as irrelevant. 198 He argued that in adopting the Constitution, the
states surrendered their sovereign immunity to the extent that they
granted "Congress specifically enumerated powers."1 99 Among these
powers is the "power to . . . provide for the . . . general welfare of
sovereign immunity issue. 415 U.S. at 670. Therefore, the Edelman Court found that
these decisions were "not of the same precedential value as would [have been] an
opinion of [the] Court treating the question on the merits." Id. at 671.
193 The Court determined that its decisions in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184
(1964), and Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959), were
inapplicable to Edelman. 415 U.S. at 672-74. The Court found that in these cases there
had been express statutory authorization for suit against the state, id. at 672, whereas in
Edelman, the Court could find no such authorization, express or implied. Id. at 674.
194 415 U.S. at 671-73 (quoting from Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151,
171 (1909)).
195 415 U.S. at 680-82 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 682-84. Justice Douglas stated that whether the eleventh amendment
would bar retroactive payments was the "sole issue" in State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972), aff'g mere. 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.
Fla. 1971). 415 U.S. at 682. Similarly, he noted that in Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49
(1970), aff'g per curiam Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the Court
awarded retroactive payments over an objection that such an order violated the eleventh
amendment. 415 U.S. at 682-83. While he recognized that the Court's decision in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968), did not address the sovereign immunity issue,
he noted that an eleventh amendment defense was rejected by the district court in that
case. 415 U.S. at 683. See Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 338 n.5 (D. Conn.
1967).
197 415 U.S. at 685-87.
198 Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 687.
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the United States." 20 0 Because Congress passed the Social Security
Act pursuant to this power, the states possessed no immunity in this
context. 201
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented on the
ground that the state waived any available eleventh amendment defense by participating in a " 'scheme of cooperative federalism.' "202
In his opinion, the Social Security Act evidenced congressional intent
203
to authorize payment of benefits wrongfully denied.
The decisions in the social security area illustrate a growing
dichotomy between the judicial treatment of interests arising under
OASDI and those arising under categorical assistance programs. In

OASDI cases for retroactive benefits, the Court has explicitly held
that a recipient's interest is one in property, worthy of fifth amendment
protection.2 0 4 Thus, although a sovereign immunity defense was not
addressed in these cases,2 0 5 it is clear that such a defense would fail.
In view of the fact that benefits are paid from a trust fund financed
solely from joint contributions by employers and employees, any
other conclusion would be difficult to support. This is especially so
considering that such contributions are mandatory. 20 6 In contrast, in
suits for retroactive benefits under categorical assistance programs,
the Court has impliedly characterized the recipient's interest as a
"gratuity." This characterization explains the Court's permissive at20 7
titude toward the invocation of an eleventh amendment defense.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see 415 U.S. at 687-88.
415 U.S. at 687-88.
202 Id. at 689-90 (quoting from King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968)). Justice
Marshall took the view that, since state participation in the assistance program was voluntary, once the state adopted the program and received federal funds, it subjected
itself to suits for violations of the Act. 4415 U.S. at 688-89.
203 415 U.S. at 690-93. Although the only express provision in the Act for enforcement of a state's obligations was the cutting off of federal funds, id. at 690, Justice
Marshall argued that the Act's provision permitting challenges by persons who had
been denied benefits, implied that payment of retroactive benefits was proper. 415 U.S.
at 690-93. He drew further support for this contention from the requirement in the
federal regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(18) (1976), that states make retroactive payment if the challenge is successful. 415 U.S. at 692-93.
204 See notes 139-147 supra and accompanying text.
205 The sovereign immunity issue was raised in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975), a suit for retroactive survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act. Id. at
753-57. In that case, the government argued that "[t]he principles of sovereign immunity applied in Edelman under the Eleventh Amendment [were] equally applicable to
suits against the United States." Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 18. By deciding
the case on the facts, however, the Court obviated any need to consider the constitutional sovereign immunity issue. 422 U.S. at 756.
206 See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
207 See notes 161-194 supra and accompanying text. Had the Court not character200

201
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Further support for the conclusions outlined above may be found
in the recent case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.2 0 8 In that decision,
petitioners instituted a class action alleging that provisions in a state
statutory retirement plan resulted in sexual discrimination in violation
of the Civil Rights Act. 20 9 Reversing a lower court decision that had
held that retroactive relief was barred under the Edelman rationale
and that Congress lacked the power to override the eleventh
amendment bar, the Court held that Congress had such power under
the fourteenth amendment. 2 10 The Court noted that in ratifying the
fourteenth amendment, the states had agreed to be amenable to suit
to the extent that Congress thought necessary to enforce the fourteenth amendment. 2 1 ' In passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
Congress had properly exercised its power of enforcement and, consequently, the state could not assert that the eleventh amendment
2 12
barred an award of retroactive benefits.
In analyzing this decision, it becomes clear that the Court
thought that some type of property interest was at stake. Because this
was so, Congress could act pursuant to section five of the fourteenth
amendment to protect the recipients' rights. In the area of categorical
assistance programs, however, the Court's retreat from the "property interest characterization of an individual's interest to the
"gratuity" characterization, has failed to guarantee such protection to
the rights of welfare recipients.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the federal social security programs pursuant
to its power to spend money for the general welfare. 2 13 The complexity of these programs is well known. The large number of congressional amendments to these programs and the multitude of administrative regulations adopted, are evidence of the frequent decisions
which must be made in the administration of national welfare
policies. Despite this complexity and the need to administer federal
programs under changing societal conditions, the Court has considerized the interest in categorical assistance as a gratuity, but rather as a property interest,
the fourteenth amendment would have barred the assertion of an eleventh amendment
defense.
208 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
209

Id.

210

Id.

211
212
213

at 448-49.
at 450-51, 458.

Id. at 452-56.
Id. at 452, 456.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-45 (1937).
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ably lessened congressional flexibility in this area by casting an award
of retroactive relief in constitutional dimensions.2 1 4 In its zeal to restore the concepts of federalism it felt had been neglected by the
Warren Court, the present Court has significantly frustrated congressional decisionmaking by precluding an effective means to ensure
compliance with federal policy. A state found to have illegally denied
benefits cannot be forced to make retroactive payments, and so future
compliance with federal regulations is undercut.
Applying the eleventh amendment proscriptions to an area which
previously had been immune to such application, has also created
problems. As was demonstrated earlier, the eleventh amendment was
initially adopted to protect states from claims arising from obligations
undertaken during the American Revolution and was later extended
to contract claims brought largely by state bondholders.2 1 5 When sig2 16
nificant federal interests were at stake, it was deemed inapplicable.
Therefore, applications of sovereign immunity concepts to areas such
as social security which are well within the ambit of federal regulation, can only lead to unnecessary confusion.
While the outright prohibition on any award of retroactive relief
is a simple approach to a complex problem, a stricter application of
the principles enunciated in the Jordan appeals court decision, would
provide greater long-term harmony and flexibility. Unlawful denial
need not be corrected by an award dating from the time of initial
eligibility. Rather, a court can condition any award in accordance
with the individual's need and in furtherance of federal policy, taking
equities into account. Such an award should be conditioned on express congressional authorization, as Congress is better equipped to
determine national needs in accordance with national goals. Also, the
possibility that an award of retroactive benefits might be made, would
probably be the most efficient means of enforcing compliance with
federal law.
214 See generally Le Clercq, supra note 5.
215 See notes 73-86 supra and accompanying text.
216 See notes 93-101 supra and accompanying text.

